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From the beginning of our nation claims of national security have
been advanced as grounds for expanding governmental powers or eas-
ing restrictions on those powers. Perhaps at no time, other than during
active war, have such claims been urged more insistently or on a
broader front than they are now. The reasons for this development lie
deep in our present political, economic, and social condition. They in-
clude the ever-growing complexities faced in the governance of a mod-
em technological nation, the radical nature of the problems that
confront us at home, the changes taking place in the world around us,
the position of the United States in global affairs, the specter of nuclear
warfare, the vulnerability of modern society to terrorist tactics, and
many others. Whatever the causes may be, the tension between na-
tional security and traditional liberties plainly poses vital questions for
our constitutional structure.
This paper will first undertake to explore some of the basic dynamics
in the conflict between national security and constitutional liberties. It
will then attempt to set forth the fundamental constitutional principles
which govern the conflict. Finally it will examine the record of the
Supreme Court in dealing with these problems, particularly in connec-
tion with more recent issues relating to the publication of national se-
curity information, political surveillance, and the rights of American
citizens abroad.'
I. The Dynamics of the Conflict
Logically, one might start out by attempting to define the term "na-
tional security" or "national security interests." This has never been
done, at least successfully, and for good reason. In its broadest scope
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the concept of "national security" is virtually without limits; it em-
braces every aspect of the general welfare of the nation. Thus, not only
is the strength of our armed forces an issue of national security, but so
also is the question of whether school children should be compelled to
salute the American flag. If one tries to confine the concept to relations
between the United States and other countries, the same dilemma con-
fronts us; almost everything that takes place in the United States has an
impact on "foreign relations." In short the concept of "national secur-
ity" is so amorphous that it is indistinguishable from the "national wel-
fare" or the welfare of the society viewed as a collective.
It is possible that the concept of "national security" might be limited
to matters that threaten the physical security of the nation, such as
threats from the large-scale use of force within the United States or
from the aggressive actions of a foreign state. This "self-defense" no-
tion of national security probably approaches more closely the core in-
tention of those who utilize the concept. Non-forceful attempts to
change the institutions of a nation, or to influence the conduct of other
nations, are normally viewed as legitimate by a democratic society and
hence should not be regarded as matters of "national security." Yet
this definition also has no firm edges. Economic as well as physical
factors play a part in national security and, again, it is hard to draw
clear dividing lines between potential and actual use of physical force
so far as national security is concerned. 2
The dilemma of formulating an acceptable definition of "national
security" may not, however, constitute a significant obstacle, depending
upon the constitutional effect given to a claim of "national security." If
the showing of a national security interest automatically triggers an ex-
pansion of governmental power or constitutes grounds for an exception
to restrictions on such power, then a clear-cut definition of "national
security" would be essential. But if, as suggested hereinafter, the exist-
ence of a national security interest does not in and of itself justify alter-
ation of constitutional principles, but is merely one factor in the
application of the constitutional principle, the focus turns not toward a
general definition of national security but toward an examination of
the specific national security factors involved in the particular situation.
In such event the difficulty of definition is not fatal to the construction
of legal doctrine. Nevertheless, the potentially unlimited scope of the
2. Efforts to define national security may be found in Note, supra note 1, at 1133; Omni-
bus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1976) (repealed 1978);
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 209 (1969) (Fortas, J.; concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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term "national security" must be kept in mind as a warning of the
length to which some arguments based on "national security" can be
carried.
Moving beyond the question of definition, it must be recognized that
threats to national security, however defined, generate severe strains
upon our system of constitutional liberties. No goal sought by a collec-
tive is likely to be considered more imperative than that of self-preser-
vation. Moreover, the facts constituting the alleged threat are likely to
be shrouded in secrecy, thereby blocking the normal functioning of the
democratic process. Under these circumstances it is not easy to devise
a system which would assure that constitutional liberties are not com-
pletely subordinated to the demands of national security.
Yet there are inherent limits to a one-sided focus on meeting threats
to national security by ignoring or subordinating constitutional liber-
ties. Individual rights are also social rights and an integral part of any
democratic society. A democratic society that seeks to protect itself by
sacrificing individual rights soon finds that it is no longer the kind of
society it purports to be. Moreover, those who framed our structure of
constitutional liberties, having just come through the ordeal of the
American Revolution, were quite aware of the pressures upon that
structure emanating from the demands of national security. The expe-
rience of the nation thus far has demonstrated that national security
goals can in fact be met without abandoning constitutional liberties.
The lesson of these considerations is that the natural tendency to prefer
the immediate demands of national security to the long-term require-
ments of a democratic community needs to be resisted strongly.
The dynamics of reconciling the requirements of national security
with the maintenance of constitutional liberties involve a number of
other considerations. The first is that claims of national security must
always be viewed with a high degree of skepticism. Governments al-
ways resent criticism or dissent and are prone to suppress such activity
in the name of national security. Governments also frequently employ
appeals to national security as a method of distracting public attention
from other problems with which the nation must deal. The secrecy at-
tached to many national security issues allows the government to in-
voke national security claims in order to cover up embarrassment,
incompetence, corruption, or outright violation of law. Subsequent
events almost always demonstrate that the asserted dangers to national
security have been grossly exaggerated. To put it another way, when
national security claims are advanced there may well be a confusion of
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the interests of the administration in power with the interests of the
nation.
Numerous examples of these tendencies can be cited. Thus President
Nixon and his aides invoked national security considerations as a basis
for breaking into the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist. The FBI
kept Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., under surveillance and harassed him
for several years on the ground that an associate had an affiliation with
the Communist Party. The government's claims that publication of the
Pentagon Papers would cause "grave and irreparable injury" to the na-
tion turned out to be wholly without foundation when the documents
were in fact published. It is not too much to say that the history of
constitutional liberty in the United States is in large part the history of
the misuse of appeals to national security.3
Second, it is necessary to keep in mind the role of the courts in help-
ing to maintain the appropriate balance between the measures neces-
sary for national security and the preservation of constitutional
liberties. Our judicial institutions are, of course, the traditional instru-
ment for protecting individual rights against encroachment by the
State. Performance of that function, with independence and courage,
would seem even more vital in connection with national security issues.
The appeal to public emotions, the temptations to exploit national se-
curity claims for illegitimate purposes, the absence of normal political
safeguards due to secrecy factors, and the inherent vagueness of the
national security concept, all make the supervisory and checking pow-
ers of the courts especially relevant in national security cases.
Nevertheless, the executive branch of government and, to some ex-
tent, the legislative have consistently endeavored to curtail or eliminate
the functions of the judiciary when national security claims are in-
yoked. The grounds for this challenge are mostly based upon custom-
ary arguments for limiting judicial review, namely, that the courts are
not competent to deal with the special problems of national security,
3. On the break-in of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, see United States v.
Ehrlichman, 376 F. Supp. 29 (D.D.C. 1974) (ruling on motions for discovery and dismissal;
discussion of national security grounds); United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (affirmingjury conviction), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1120 (1977). With respect to Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr., see D. GARROW, THE FBI AND MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. (1981).
The government's claims in the Pentagon Papers case are set forth in N.Y. Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717-19 (1971). On the activities of the intelligence agencies, see
generally SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOV'TAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLI-
GENCE ACTIVITIES, FINAL REPORT, S. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (Church
Comm. Report); M. HALPERIN, J. BERMAN, R. BOROSAGE & C. MARWICK, THE LAWLESS
STATE (1976); D. WISE, THE AMERICAN POLICE STATE (1976); F. DONNER, THE AGE OF
SURVEILLANCE: THE AIMS AND METHODS OF AMERICA'S POLITICAL SYSTEM (1980).
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that only the executive branch possesses the necessary expertise, that
oversight by the courts entails delay and impairs effective action, that
undue administrative burdens are imposed upon the executive, and the
like. There seems no reason to accept these assertions as carrying more
weight in national security cases than in the numerous other cases with
which the courts deal every day. With the possible exception of some
issues in the area of foreign relations, the functions of neutral oversight
in national security cases does not entail problems that are too complex
or administratively awkward for our judicial institutions. The one con-
tention peculiar to national security matters-that the courts cannot be
trusted with state secrets-is difficult to take seriously.4
Finally, it is important to remember the nature of the search for true
national security. It cannot be a search for total security. That is only
achievable in a police state, and then only temporarily. National secur-
ity in a democratic society involves taking some risks and allowing
some flexibility. It entails faith that an open community is better pre-
pared to adjust to changing conditions than a closed one. It is based
upon the proposition that the creation of economic, political, and social
institutions that respond to the needs of the people is a better protection
than implacable enforcement of sedition laws, loyalty programs, and
regulations classifying information as secret.
II. The Basic Constitutional Structure
The basic constitutional doctrine that governs the reconciliation of
national security and constitutional liberties is firmly established. We
start with the fundamental proposition that the exercise of governmen-
tal power to achieve national security is subject to the same limitations
as the exercise of governmental power to secure other social goals. In
other words, the existence of national security considerations does not
justify the suspension, modification, or abandonment of constitutional
rights. This remains true regardless of the source of governmental
power, whether it rests on direct legislative mandate, delegation from
the legislature to the executive, the inherent powers of the Chief Execu-
tive, or any other basis.
The Supreme Court has consistently adhered to this position in a
series of cases where the government has contended, directly or in ef-
fect, that traditional constitutional limitations were superseded by the
4. Arguments for limiting the scope of judicial review in national security cases were
considered in detail and rejected by the courts in United States v. United States Dist. Court,
407 U.S. 297 (1972); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 944 (1976).
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demands of national security. Thus in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer 5 (the Steel Seizure case) President Truman, faced with the
threat of a strike in the steel industry during the Korean War, took
possession of the mills in order to maintain production. "The indis-
pensability of steel as a component of substantially all weapons and
other war materials," the Court noted, "led the President to believe that
the proposed work stoppage would immediately jeopardize our na-
tional defense and that governmental seizure of the steel mills was nec-
essary in order to assure the continued availability of steel." 6 There
was, however, no legislative enactment which authorized the President
to take this action. The thrust of the government's argument was that
the constitutional principle of separation of powers did not apply where
the President acted in the name of national defense. The Court flatly
rejected the government's position, saying "we cannot with faithfulness
to our constitutional system" uphold the President's action.7 "The
Founders of this Nation," the Court declared, "entrusted the lawmak-
ing power to the Congress alone in both good and bad times."8
In New York Times Co. v. United States9 (the Pentagon Papers case),
the government sought to enjoin the New York Times, the Washington
Post, and other newspapers from publishing the Pentagon Papers, a
classified history of the Viet Nam War obtained from a former govern-
ment employee. The government asserted that publication would
cause "grave and irreparable injury" to the nation and that this justi-
fied an exception to the constitutional prohibition against prior re-
straint. The government contention, if upheld, would have meant
abandonment of the doctrine of prior restraint in national security
cases. The Court refused to accept the government position. While a
majority did not agree upon any one theory of the prior restraint rule, it
did squarely hold that, despite substantial injury to national security,
the prior restraint doctrine remained in force. 10
United States v. United States District Court" (the Keith case) in-
volved a criminal prosecution for conspiracy to dynamite an office of
the CIA. The government's case rested in part upon evidence obtained
by wiretapping that was admittedly in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment unless justified on grounds of national security. The government
5. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
6. Id. at 583.
7. Id. at 587.
8. Id. at 589.
9. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
10. See id.
11. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
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claimed the power "to gather intelligence information deemed neces-
sary to protect the nation from attempts of domestic organizations to
attack and subvert the existing structure of the Government"' 2 and that
its action was "a reasonable exercise of the President's power . . to
protect the national security."'13 In effect, the government was asserting
a broad exemption from Fourth Amendment requirements in national
security cases. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Powell,
unanimously ruled against the government's position. "We recognize,"
it said, "the constitutional basis of the President's domestic security
role, but we think it must be exercised in a manner compatible with the
Fourth Amendment."'14
Even in the area of foreign affairs, where the exercise of presidential
powers is least subject to judicial control, the President is bound to act
within constitutional limitations. In United States v. Curtiss- Wright Ex-
port Corp.,15 the first and still key case on the powers of the President
as the sole organ of the government in international relations, the
Supreme Court asserted unequivocally that such power "of course, like
every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to
the applicable provisions of the Constitution."' 6
The position of the Supreme Court is rooted in the fundamental na-
ture of our constitutional order. Abandonment of constitutional princi-
ples as the price of achieving national security would sacrifice the very
values upon which our society ultimately rests. The Court made this
clear in United States v. Robel,17 a case in which the government sought
to justify an industrial loyalty program on national security grounds:
[T]his concept of "national defense" cannot be deemed an end in itself,
justifying any exercise of legislative power designed to promote such a
goal. Implicit in the term "national defense" is the notion of defending
those values and ideals which set this Nation apart .... It would indeed
be ironic if, in the name of national defense, we would sanction the sub-
version of one of those liberties-freedom of association-which makes
the defense of the Nation worthwhile.' 8
What has been said up to this point, however, tells only half the
12. Id. at 300.
13. Id. at 301.
14. Id. at 320.
15. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
16. Id. at 320, quotedin Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 289 (1981).
17. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
18. Id. at 264. The one case in which the Supreme Court might be conceived as turning
in the other direction is Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), upholding the
Japanese detention program during World War II. Korematsu, however, is in effect a mar-
tial law case.
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story. The other half is that in the process of applying constitutional
principles in concrete cases the courts retain enormous discretion to de-
termine whether governmental power to achieve national security goals
has indeed been exercised in a manner compatible with constitutional
limitations. This leeway in the courts derives in part from the fact that
national security factors are of course relevant in the decision-making
process and may strongly influence the way in which the constitutional
principle is given effect. Thus in the Keith case the Supreme Court
observed: "We recognize that domestic security surveillance may in-
volve different policy and practical considerations from the surveil-
lance of 'ordinary crime.'"19 Furthermore, when constitutional
doctrine is loosely formulated, as in the balancing test, the courts have
free rein to evaluate opposing interests. Thus an open-ended judgment
as to the weight to be accorded national security considerations, as op-
posed to enforcement of constitutional limitations, is reintroduced at
the level of concrete application.20
For reasons already stated, this contest between national security and
constitutional liberty tends to be an unequal one. The heaviest pres-
sures are usually found on the side of national security and the rights of
the individual are readily balanced away. This outcome can be
avoided only if the courts exercise firm discipline and adhere to a set of
subsidiary equalizing principles. These principles, which are derived
from the past experience of the Supreme Court in upholding constitu-
tional liberties against insistent governmental claims to national secur-
ity, include the following:
1. Constitutional principles protecting individual liberties occupy a
preferred position in the hierarchy of democratic values; hence there is
a presumption in favor of the constitutional right.
2. Government claims of injury to national security must be viewed
with a healthy skepticism.
3. The burden of proof to demonstrate its case rests upon the
government.
4. The government must show a direct, immediate, grave, and spe-
cific harm to national security, not just a vague or speculative threat.
5. The restriction sought by the government must be confined to
the narrowest possible constraint necessary to achieve the goal.
6. Wherever possible, hard and fast rules, rather than loose balanc-
ing tests, should be formulated and applied.
19. 407 U.S. at 322.
20. Id.
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It is in the light of these considerations that the record of the
Supreme Court in national security cases should be appraised.
III. The Record of the Supreme Court
The record of the Supreme Court in cases where constitutional liber-
ties are sought to be restricted in the name of national security is a
mixed one. The earliest decisions involved prohibition of expression
alleged to create insubordination in the armed forces or interference
with recruitment for the military; anti-sedition laws, such as the Smith
Act, punishing advocacy of overthrow of the government by force or
violence; loyalty qualifications for employment in the government or
defense industry or for obtaining other government benefits or privi-
leges; investigation of dissenting political speech or association by legis-
lative committees; and similar forms of government control over
expression alleged to constitute a threat to national security. After a
period of vavering, in which the Court applied the bad tendency test,
the clear and present danger test, and various balancing tests, the Court
in 1969 came to settle on the Brandenburg rule. Under this test, critical
or dissenting expression alleged to threaten national security can be
suppressed, directly or indirectly, only where it "is directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action.'' 21 While this formulation leaves considerable discretion
in courts, prosecutors, and police, and might provide only weak protec-
tion in a period of crisis, it has thus far proved to be a livable
accommodation.
In more recent years the conflict between constitutional liberties and
national security has taken other forms. With the growth of the classi-
fication process and other manifestations of governmental secrecy, con-
trol over the publication of materials which the government wishes to
keep from public knowledge has posed major issues for the system of
freedom of expression. Government efforts to gather intelligence infor-
mation, and to counter dissenting political activities, have also raised
the problem of keeping the government's conduct within constitutional
boundaries. Finally, the right of American citizens to travel abroad, as
21. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969),followedin Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S.
105 (1973); Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Simon, 460 F. Supp. 56 (C.D. Cal. 1978), aJf'd
sub nom. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Blumenthal, 441 U.S. 938 (1979). For a discus-
sion of the cases, see T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, chs. 4-8
(1970). See also 1 N. DORSEN, P. BENDER, B. NEUBOURNE & T. EMERSON, HARBER &
DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES, ch. 2 (Law School Edition)
(4th ed. 1976).
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well as their rights when abroad, have come under renewed pressure
from national security considerations.
A. Dissemination of National Security Information
Any attempt by the government to control the dissemination of na-
tional security information strikes at the heart of the democratic pro-
cess. Under our Constitution, where "We the People" are sovereign,
citizens must have access to all information available in order to in-
struct and supervise their servants, the government. Therefore, all gov-
ernment business is, generally speaking, the public's business. Secrecy
in government operations, though sometimes justified, must be held to
a bare minimum, and that minimum must be carefully and explicitly
defined. This presumption in favor of full discussion of public issues is
plainly applicable to national security information. Surely preparation
for an invasion of Cuba or the conduct of covert operations in Central
America should not be concealed from the American people.
Thus far we have had in this country a relatively loose system of
controls over the dissemination of national security information. There
is no evidence that the national safety has suffered thereby. On the
contrary a relaxed policy in this important sector has certainly strength-
ened our democratic institutions. In recent years, however, there have
been demands for broader and more rigid restrictions, and the move-
ment has been in that direction. The issues posed by this development
are crucial to our future as an open society.
Analysis of the problem may begin with an area that is clearly sub-
ject to governmental control-the area of traditional espionage. A
more controversial issue concerns limitations upon the publication of
national security information that has escaped government control and
entered the public domain. The third current problem relates to the
nature of the secrecy measures available to prevent loss of information
in the possession of the government.
1. Traditional Espionage
Espionage, although it involves conduct that resembles speech, has
never been thought to be covered by the First Amendment or to have
any degree of First Amendment protection. The underlying reason for
this is that espionage is not properly part of our system of freedom of
expression. It is not undertaken, within the context of our society, as an
aspect of the public discussion, participation in decision-making, or le-
gitimizing process that are crucial elements in the system of free expres-
sion. Rather, espionage is characterized by being inseparable from
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action Moreover, its origins lie outside our society; its base and justifi-
cation are to be found in a society other than our own.
This unique status of traditional espionage, which entitles us to ex-
clude it from our system of constitutional protection for speech, derives
from certain special features of the conduct involved. It is crucial,
therefore, to isolate those factors, to define them carefully, and to limit
the statutory prohibition against espionage to the area thus delineated.
The essential features that make up the activity of espionage are (1) the
communication (2) of significant national security information (3) to a
foreign power (4) with the intent that (a) the information be used by the
foreign power (b) to injure the national defense of the United States.
Translated into more concrete terms, this means that espionage deals
with a direct communication, not the dissemination of information to
the public for purposes of informing and facilitating public discussion.
The information must be of substantial importance and relate to de-
fense against violence from external forces. In other words, it must be
confined to limited categories of classified information, properly so
classified. The information must be conveyed to a foreign power, or its
agent, not merely to the public generally. Crucially important, the gov-
ernment must prove that the person making the communication has
done so with the primary intent that the information be used by the
foreign power to the injury of our national defense. If the communica-
tion is intended to serve a general First Amendment purpose, but also
happens to benefit a foreign power, it cannot be prohibited as constitut-
ing espionage.
Existing statutes, although ambiguous, can be construed to embody
this concept of espionage. Recently the government has attempted to
extend the scope of the espionage laws to include the communication of
information not intended to aid a foreign power or injure the United
States. The Supreme Court has not expressly ruled on these issues, nor
has Congress amended the statutes. The traditional concept has thus
far provided an adequate basis for protection against espionage activi-
ties directed at the United States from abroad. There is no reason to
extend the reach of the espionage laws.22
22. The espionage law was upheld in Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19 (1941). See
also United States v. Heine, 151 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 833 (1946).
For a full discussion, see Edgar & Schmidt, The Espionage Statutes and Publication of De.
fense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929 (1973). Governmental attempts to extend the
scope of the laws were made in the prosecution of Daniel Ellsberg and Michael Russo for
obtaining and disseminating the Pentagon Papers, United States v. Ellsberg (S.D. Cal.), dis-
missed by the trial court because of government misconduct, and in United States v. Truong,
629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1144 (1982).
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2. Dissemination of National Security Information that has Come into
the Public Domain
At any moment there is in circulation in the United States a substan-
tial volume of national security information that the government has
wished to keep secret, but which has escaped its grasp and has entered
the public domain. This information comes from deliberate leaks by
government officials, either by those supporting or those opposing gov-
ernment policies or anticipated policies, bureaucratic mistakes, discov-
ery in judicial proceedings, investigative reporting, piecing together
various bits of information, purloined material, memoirs of former
government employees, and similar sources. The information may be
published for the first time, or may be a repeat of information previ-
ously published. It may or may not be classified. It ranges from per-
sonal gossip to the Pentagon Papers. In total this information
represents a high percentage of what the American public knows about
important national security issues. Its significance for public participa-
tion in decision-making is difficult to overemphasize. One might al-
most say that the availability of this information represents the
difference between an open and a closed society.
The question presented is whether the government should be permit-
ted to prohibit dissemination of this type of information. At the outset,
two general considerations need to be stated. First, it is virtually im-
possible to maintain effective controls over the circulation of such in-
formation and still preserve a democratic society. The volume is
enormous, and the outlets for dissemination are virtually limitless. An
elaborate apparatus of investigators, files, prosecutors, and the like
would be needed. In the end enforcement efforts are bound to be dis-
criminatory, directed only against publication by critics and dissenters.
In short, the costs of administration would be high, not to say
prohibitive.
Second, prohibition of the dissemination of information in the public
domain would run counter to one of the basic principles of our consti-
tutional structure. Apart from the traditional areas of libel, obscenity,
and incitement to violence, the Supreme Court has never sanctioned a
restriction upon the circulation of information in the public domain.
On the contrary, the Court has consistently struck down all efforts at
government control of such material.23
In view of these considerations the case against any broad prohibi-
tion of the publication of national security information is overwhelm-
23. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979); Landmark Communica-
tions, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539
(1976); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
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ing. It would mean the adoption of an official secrets act that would
foreclose any real public discussion of national security issues, ham-
string the press, and undermine the whole system of free expression.
Congress has steadfastly refused to adopt such measures in the past.
Any attempt to do so would certainly run afoul of the First
Amendment.
The only real issue before us, then, is whether the publication of
some specific, narrowly defined types of national security information
should be subject to restriction. Both theory and practice suggest that
there is no need for such exceptions and that any attempt to enforce
them by law would seriously endanger our free institutions.
The question came before the Supreme Court, in the context of a
prior restraint, in the Pentagon Papers case. As noted above, the Court
rejected the government's contention that a showing of injury to the
national security, sufficient to overcome the rule against prior restraint,
had been made. The result, a major victory for freedom of expression,
is attributable to adherence by a majority of the justices to the subsidi-
ary principles that are crucial in resolving a conflict between the gov-
ernment claims of national security and the maintenance of
constitutional liberties. Thus the majority of the Court was sensitive to
the high value placed upon freedom to discuss public issues. They re-
acted with skepticism to the government claims of "grave and immedi-
ate danger" to the national security. Those who did not adopt an
absolute or near-absolute rule against prior retraint put the burden on
the government to demonstrate its case by specific, not speculative,
facts and to confine constraint to the narrowest possible scope.24
On the other hand, the Court failed to agree upon any one theory of
the case and left open substantial doctrinal loopholes. The per curiam
opinion subscribed to by the majority of six justices simply said that the
government had not met the "heavy burden of showing justification for
the imposition of [a prior] restraint. '2 5 There were nine individual
opinions. Justices Black and Douglas took an absolute position, assert-
ing that the government had no power under any circumstances to
"make laws enjoining publication of current news and abridging free-
dom of the press in the name of 'national security.' "26 Justice Brennan
added one reservation, holding that "only governmental allegation and
proof that publication must inevitably, directly, and immediately cause
the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a trans-
24. 403 U.S. at 741.
25. Id. at 714.
26. Id. at 718.
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port already at sea" 27 could support issuance of a restraining order.
Justices Stewart and White thought that a prior restraint was permissi-
ble upon a showing of "direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to
our Nation or its people. ' 28 Justice Marshall did not pass on the First
Amendment issue, resting his opinion on separation of powers grounds,
namely that Congress had never authorized the executive branch to
utilize the power of the courts to prevent publication of national secur-
ity information. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Harlan and Black-
mun, dissenting, believed that the judiciary should exercise only
minimal review over a finding of the executive that disclosure of infor-
mation "would irreparably impair the national security. '29
The diversity of opinion, as well as changes in the composition of the
Supreme Court, leave it uncertain as to what limiting standard the
Court might adopt in future prior restraint cases. A strong argument
can be made, however, that any doctrine less rigorous than the Brennan
standard would constitute an unsatisfactory resolution of the issues.
This conclusion follows from a number of considerations:
1. The Stewart-White formulation, allowing a prior restraint when
there is a showing of "direct, immediate, and irreparable damage" to
national security, or a similar formula, is totally vague. There is no
clear cut-off point. Neither the press nor the ordinary citizen could
know in advance whether such a standard would be met. The courts
could reach any conclusion. In short, the potential for suppression of
publication is limitless.
2. The Stewart-White standard does not give any weight to the so-
cial and individual interests in freedom of expression. Consideration is
limited to the alleged harm to national security. Of course, a full-fledg-
ed balancing test would be equally subject to the criticism of vagueness.
3. Any formulation allowing an exception to the ban against prior
restraint is fundamentally inconsistent with the prior restraint doctrine
itself. If the Stewart-White formula is adopted, for instance, the gov-
ernment could simply allege that publication would cause "direct, im-
mediate, and irreparable damage," and thereby obtain a restraining
order until the court could hold a hearing and decide the issue. Ap-
peals to a higher court could then be taken. Thus the application of the
standard becomes in itself a system of prior restraint. This is exactly
what happened in the Progressive Magazine case, where government
allegations prevented the publication of an article on the manufacture
of the hydrogen bomb for seven months until the government, finding
27. Id. at 726-27.
28. Id. at 730.
29. Id. at 757.
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the material in the article publicly available, gave up its attempt at
restraint. 30
4. In most cases the validity of the government's claim can be as-
certained, without divulging information that the government wishes to
keep secret, only through secret proceedings. This means that the par-
ties and their lawyers cannot know what the case is about without se-
curity clearance, a privilege conferred by the government itself, and
perhaps not even then. The public, of course, is left completely in the
dark. Such a process hardly commends itself to a democratic people.
Any exception to the rule against prior restraint, as it applies to com-
munications within our system of freedom of expression, should there-
fore be rejected by the courts. One qualification, however, which is
suggested in the Brennan formulation, should be noted. The civilian
system of freedom of expression does not extend, at least in all its as-
pects, to the military sector. Military operations are not, and cannot be,
conducted according to democratic principles. Therefore, where the in-
formation involved is entirely within the military sector the usual rule
against prior restraint does not have its customary force. 31
This is not to say that the civilian sector does not have full control
over the military. Obviously civilian supremacy is an integral part of
our constitutional structure. But it does mean that the civilian sector
may delegate certain tasks to the military. It is contemplated that the
military will carry out those assignments by its own methods, which do
not necessarily follow the democratic principles by which the civilian
sector operates. From this it follows that where the civilian sector has
conferred specific functions upon the military, communications relating
to such matters are outside the civilian system of freedom of
expression.
The kinds of communications thus embraced in the military sector,
and hence not governed by the civilian rules against prior restraint,
would include such matters as the detail of tactical military operations,
such as troop movements, details concerning the design of new weap-
ons, secret codes, and the like. The matters delegated exclusively to the
military would be more extensive in time of war, but there would also
be such delegations in time of peace. The delegation would not include
30. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.), requestfor manda-
mus denied sub nom. Morland v. Sprecher, 443 U.S. 709 (1979), case dismissed without opin-
ion, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979). Justice Brennan made the same point in the Pentagon
Papers case, 403 U.S. at 726-27.
31. This and the following three paragraphs are based on the argument originally set
forth in an amicus brief filed by the author and Professor Lee Bollinger on behalf of Scien-
toc American in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in the Progres-
sive Magazine case.
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significant matters of policy or basic decisions, such as the decision to
develop a neutron bomb, or whether to invade Cambodia. These mat-
ters involve communications about military affairs within the civilian
community and clearly fall within the civilian system of freedom of
expression.
There is no doubt that the problem of drawing the line between the
civilian sector and the military sector for these purposes poses some
problems. But the difficulties are no worse than those incurred in many
other areas of the law, such as the Supreme Court's task of deciding
what material is "obscene" and thereby not protected by the First
Amendment. In any event, the proposal made here provides a rational
theory by which judgments, troublesome as some of them may be in
practice, can be made.
The considerations which rule out issuance of a prior restraint
against publication of material in the public domain also preclude the
use of subsequent punishment for dissemination of such information.
The vagueness of the national security concept, the potential reach of
restrictions which undertake to suppress the publication of information
that has entered the public domain, the inhibiting costs of enforcing
such attempts at censorship, and the impact on the public's right to
know all argue against the extension of criminal or other penalties be-
yond the area of traditional espionage.
The problems raised by the employment of criminal sanctions to pre-
vent publication of material in the public domain are well illustrated by
the Intelligence Identities Protection Act 32 enacted by Congress in
1982. That legislation makes it a criminal offense for any person, "in
the course of a pattern of activities intended to identify and expose cov-
ert agents," who has "reason to believe that such activities would im-
pair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States,"
to disclose "any information that identifies an individual as a covert
agent . . . knowing that . . . the United States is taking affirmative
measures to conceal such individual's classified intelligence relation-
ship to the United States."' 33 The term "covert agent" is defined to in-
clude persons engaged or formerly engaged in foreign intelligence
activities, including such activities taking place in the United States.34
The scope and impact of this legislation are far-reaching. The stat-
ute applies not only to government officials involved in foreign intelli-
gence, but also to all agents, informants, and other sources. It includes
not only information that is classified, but all information, no matter
32. 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 421-26 (West Supp. 1983).
33. Id. § 421(c).
34. Id. § 426(4).
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how readily available or widely circulated. It covers not only disclo-
sure of the names of "covert agents," but of any material that would
"identify" them. As a result it would seriously hamper or make impos-
sible the study or reporting of much, or most, of the activities of agen-
cies engaged in foreign intelligence. Thus investigative journalists
seeking to ascertain the role of the CIA in the overthrow of the Allende
government in Chile, its part in the attempted assassination of Fidel
Castro, or even its recruitment efforts on college campuses would be
subject to criminal prosecution. Moreover, the statute has other, per-
haps unanticipated, effects. It would, for example, make it a criminal
offense for members of an organization to expose government inform-
ers who have infiltrated their organization. 35
The Intelligence Identities Protection Act is, perhaps, an extreme ex-
ample of the encroachment of criminal legislation upon freedom of
speech and of the press. Yet any attempt to impose a criminal penalty
upon the publication of material in the public domain would entail
similar consequences. The fact is that the employment of criminal
sanctions to stop the dissemination of information that is already in
circulation-in other words, the enactment of an official secrets act-is
incompatible with our system of freedom of expression. Nor, as the
Pentagon Papers and the Progressive Magazine cases demonstrate, can
such restrictions actually succeed in preventing the dissemination of in-
formation except through the use of methods that border on those of a
police state.
3. Security Measures to Prevent Loss of Information in the Possession
of the Government36
There is dispute over the power of the government, in constitutional
terms, to withhold information from the public, and the propriety, in
policy terms, of doing so. On either basis it is clear that government
secrecy should be held within the narrowest possible bounds. There is
no need, however, to consider these issues here. It is generally agreed
that the government can keep some information secret, including some
national security information. The question, therefore, is what meas-
ures are permissible to maintain that security. The problem is not a
35. Although the above provisions were not in issue before the Senate-House Confer-
ence Committee, that committee's report sets forth a narrower interpretation than a literal
reading of the statute would suggest. H.R. REP. No. 580, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). The
impact of the Conference Committee report upon the application of the Act by investigators,
prosecutors, and courts cannot be predicted. In any event, under any interpretation, the Act
creates criminal penalties for the publication of material in the public domain.
36. The discussion in this section is based upon the testimony of the author before the
Subcommittee of Legislation of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
United States House of Representatives, Jan. 31, 1979.
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simple one because internal security procedures have a far-reaching ef-
fect upon the whole system of freedom of expression.
So far as persons outside the government are concerned, the restric-
tions plainly should be confined to those which are applicable to any
form of newsgathering, either from the government or from other
sources, and whether involving national security information or other
information. Such measures include prohibition against burglary,
wiretapping, use of physical force, bribery, and the like. To limit news-
gathering beyond this point, or to punish retention of information, is
simply an indirect way of prohibiting publication. If, as we have ar-
gued, publication is to be permitted-indeed as a constitutional matter
must be permitted-then essential preparations which are part of the
process cannot be restricted.
The problems involved in limiting the dissemination of national se-
curity information by persons inside the government-government em-
ployees, employees of government contractors, and former
employees-are much more complex. Clearly the government is enti-
tled to apply sanctions for violation of legitimate rules and regulations
prohibiting the circulation of information the government has a right to
keep secret. These sanctions could cover all kinds of conduct necessary
to assure that the information is available within the government only
to those who need it for legitimate purposes, and to make certain that it
does not escape from the confines of the government. Thus restrictions
limiting the right to obtain information, to retain it after it has been
acquired, and to communicate it to others are all permissible. Clearly,
also, the rules can be enforced by administrative sanctions, ranging
from reprimand to dismissal. Beyond this point, however, a number of
questions emerge.37
The most important issue is whether the government should be em-
powered to enforce its restrictions through criminal sanctions, where
the information has been communicated to outsiders with the intent
that it be used for First Amendment purposes. With narrow exceptions
the law does not now provide for criminal sanctions in this situation.
There are strong- arguments of policy, and some of constitutional law,
37. The principal method by which the government seeks to protect national security
information from disclosure is the classification system, established by Executive Orders, the
most recent of which is Exec. Order No. 12,356, 47 Fed. Reg. 12,874 (1982). On the right of
the government to impose restrictions upon speech or other expression by its employees, see
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 845 (1978); Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 552-55 (1976); United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National
Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968);
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63 (1966); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330
U.S. 75 (1947).
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for adhering to that position.38
In the first place, as already noted, the amount of information which
slips through the government's fingers is so enormous, the system of
leaks so pervasive, and the possibility of stemming the tide so out of
reach, that application of criminal sanctions for divulging information
would hardly be workable. Prosecutions would be highly selective,
thereby unfair, and subject to serious abuse. Limitation of the criminal
sanction to classified information would be no solution. The classifica-
tion system always has and always will be greatly overused and abused.
Second, if criminal sanctions were seriously enforced the amount of
information reaching the public about government operations would
be drastically curtailed. Government employees would be especially
vulnerable to criminal prosecution because the courts have refused to
recognize a reporter's privilege and hence the source of information
could be readily traced to them. As a result government employees
would be afraid to disclose any information, no matter how strong the
justification for doing so. Information about critical government poli-
cies would be shut off. Incompetence, arbitrariness, and corruption in
government would never see the light of day. Antiquated policies and
procedures would be perpetuated. "Whistle blowing" would largely
cease.
39
Third, the application of criminal sanctions to government employ-
ees could not fail to have momentous repercussions on the freedom of
the press, scholars, and others to discuss national security issues. The
press, for example, would inevitably be drawn into criminal investiga-
tions, conducted by the FBI, military intelligence, or other intelligence
agencies. Newspapers would constantly be called upon or subpoenaed
to produce documents or notes of interviews, to answer questions as to
their sources of information and methods of operation, to appear
before grand juries, and to render account otherwise to investigating
officials. As just stated, the reporter's privilege would not protect them,
certainly not from investigation and in most instances not from produc-
ing confidential material or revealing confidential sources. Further-
more, the impact would not stop there. Under laws of conspiracy,
attempt, solicitation, accessory to crime, and the like, news reporters,
scholars, and even editors would be subject to prosecution themselves.
The constitutional right of publication would hardly amount to much
under such conditions.
38. For an examination of the current law pertaining to the application of criminal sanc-
tions for improper disclosure of information by government employees, see Edgar &
Schmidt, supra note 22.
39. On reporter's privilege, see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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Fourth, there has been no showing that administrative sanctions and
other administrative security measures have been inadequate to assure
government secrecy to the degree actually needed. The sanction of dis-
cipline or dismissal is a potent one for any bureaucrat. Up to now the
absence of criminal sanctions has not proved to leave a serious gap in
our security system.
If criminal sanctions are permitted, however, they should be ex-
tremely limited in scope and surrounded with all possible safeguards.
Thus the criminal sanction should be applied only to the disclosure of
certain narrow and specific types of classified information. These cate-
gories should not extend beyond such matters as cryptographic tech-
niques, technical details of weapons, technical details of military
operations, military contingency plans, and the like. The defense that
the information was improperly classified at the time of the offense
should be allowed. Finally, an overall defense of justification, which
would permit the accused to show mitigating circumstances, should be
provided.
The other main problem involving measures to prevent the dissemi-
nation of government information relates to the use of contracts. At
the present time the CIA, the State Department, the Department of
Defense, and a growing number of other agencies require employees,
as a condition of employment, to enter into a written agreement not to
disclose information obtained during the course of employment with-
out prior approval of the agency. This contract arrangement is primar-
ily a device to control the disclosure of information by former
employees; during the period of employment other methods of control
are available.
The contract device is potentially a far-reaching, suffocating method
of blacking out crucial information about the operations of government
agencies. Former employees are frequently the only source of impor-
tant knowledge. Often they are the only persons in a position to reveal
information about the inner recesses of a bureaucracy. The contract
method could be used to reduce information from this source to a
trickle.
In examining this problem it is important to recognize that the issue
should not be viewed as a simple matter of private contract law. Just as
government information cannot be considered "property" in the nor-
mal sense, so these non-disclosure agreements are not really "con-
tracts." They are laws, enacted by government and imposed upon
government employees and ex-employees, that deeply affect the whole
system of freedom of expression. They must be viewed in First
Amendment terms, not private contract terms.
In this light clearly any extensive use or enforcement of the contract
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device is contrary to sound public policy, a violation of the right of a
citizen to communicate with fellow citizens, and an infringement upon
the public's right to know. The only question is what narrow limits
should be placed upon the use of such contracts.
The problem is a difficult one. It is true that a person who obtains
information from a position inside government should be less free to
publish that information than a person who obtains it from a position
outside the government. The ex-employee is in a sort of middle posi-
tion. The obligation of such a person to abide by the rules of the or-
ganization still exists, but not to the same degree or intensity as before.
And the needs of the public to have access to information otherwise
unobtainable are stronger as the interests of the government to main-
tain control over its employees lessen. The effect on the whole system
of freedom of expression remains a factor.
Under these circumstances it would seem that some intermediate po-
sition best accommodates the competing interests. First Amendment
considerations certainly demand that, as a general proposition, former
employees be free to communicate information derived from their serv-
ice in the government. On the other hand, unlike the right of publica-
tion by outsiders, or the application of criminal sanctions to
communication by insiders, some exceptions to the general rule appear
justified. These would be of the same nature as those suggested as a
last resort (but preferably rejected) in the discussion of making govern-
ment employees subject to criminal sanctions. In other words, con-
tracts not to divulge information after leaving the government might be
acceptable if confined to a narrow range of properly classified materi-
als, with a justification defense allowed. In addition, authority to de-
mand such contracts should be limited to a small number of agencies
that deal with the most sensitive national security information.40
The effort of the Supreme Court to deal with these issues has thus far
been a disaster. The question first arose in the Marchetti case.
Marchetti, a former CIA employee, had signed the standard agreement.
When the government learned that Marchetti was writing a book deal-
ing with the CIA, it brought suit to enjoin him from publishing it until
he had obtained approval from the CIA. The lower courts granted the
injunction and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Upon submission
of the manuscript the CIA ordered 339 deletions, later reduced to 168.
Marchetti sought review of the CIA action in the courts, but the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the government's action, rul-
40. For a discussion of the censorship agreement, see Comment, National Security and
the First Amendment: The CIA in the Marketplace of Ideas, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 655
(1979).
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ing that the government could suppress any classified information even
though the validity of the classification was not established. Despite
issuance of a prior restraint and the suppression of information that
might have been improperly classified, the Supreme Court again re-
fused to consider the case.4 1
The Supreme Court did, however, reach the issues in Snepp v. United
States,42 decided in 1980. Snepp, also a former CIA employee, was the
author of a book, Decent Interval, which dealt with the withdrawal of
United States forces from Viet Nam in the last days of the war. The
book had been published without having been submitted to the CIA in
advance. The government brought suit to enjoin Snepp from further
publication without obtaining CIA approval and for the imposition of
a "constructive trust" which would require Snepp to pay over any prof-
its from Decent Interval to the government. Snepp asserted, and the
government agreed for the purposes of the case, that the book con-
tained no classified information. The district court granted the injunc-
tion and imposed the constructive trust. The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the injunction order but refused to approve the
constructive trust. The Supreme Court, without waiting for briefs on
the merits or hearing oral argument, in a per curiam opinion affirmed
the issuance of the injunction and reinstated the constructive trust.43
The Court's opinion dealt, almost exclusively, with the validity and
propriety of the constructive trust. It touched on the prior restraint and
other First Amendment issues only in a footnote. Declaring that Snepp
had "voluntarily signed the agreement," it concluded:
The Government has a compelling interest in protecting both the se-
crecy of information important to our national security and the appear-
ance of confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign
intelligence service .... The agreement that Snepp signed is a reason-
able means for protecting this vital interest.44
This cavalier treatment of constitutional liberty by the Supreme
Court in the Snepp case violated most of the principles essential to as-
suring that the safeguarding of national security is accomplished within
the limits of our constitutional system. Far from giving presumptive
weight to constitutional values, the Court accepted the so-called con-
tract as binding without even considering its impact upon the former
employee's right to expression or upon the public's right to know, ap-
41. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063
(1972); see also Knopf v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975).
42. 456 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Va. 1978), modfed, 595 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1979), modoed,
444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented.
43. 444 U.S. at 507.
44. Id. at 509.
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proved almost casually the imposition of a prior restraint, and sanc-
tioned a major restriction upon First Amendment rights subject only to
the limitation that it be "reasonable." The Court took at face value,
without examination, the government's claim that censorship, even of
unclassified material, was essential to the operations of an intelligence
agency because necessary to preserve the "appearance of confidential-
ity." It laid down no requirement for the government to demonstrate a
direct and specific harm from the publication. And it made no effort to
limit the constraints upon expression to the least drastic necessary to
achieve a permissible goal. The Snepp decision must be classed as an
aberration, not within the mainstream of American constitutional
law.45
B. National Security and Surveillance of Political Activities
The power of the government to engage in surveillance of political
activities has now become a major issue in the United States. Recent
disclosures of the practices of the FBI, the CIA, Army Intelligence, and
other intelligence agencies have shocked the American people into
awareness of a problem that has become more and more menacing over
the past decades. Not only was it revealed that the intelligence agen-
cies had amassed dossiers on the political beliefs, associations, and ac-
tivities of hundreds of thousands of American citizens who were not
alleged to have engaged in any violation of law but also that they had
gone further and, by infiltration, spreading of rumors, intimidation and
similar tactics, had proceeded affirmatively to harass individual targets
and disrupt organizations. Their methods included illegal break-ins,
wiretapping, bugging, mail opening, and even violence. The intelli-
gence agencies, in short, had taken upon themselves the function of
monitoring and repressing legitimate efforts for social change.46
The legal remedy for this state of affairs must ultimately be found in
legislation. Although the executive branch has instituted some reforms,
such as the Guidelines issued by Attorney General Edward Levi in
1976, executive action has imposed only modest limitations on the in-
telligence agencies and, in any event, is subject to change at any time.
Unfortunately, efforts to enact legislation, with the exception of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, have been unsuccessful. Mean-
while, however, it is important that the constitutional principles which
45. For further discussion of the Snepp case, see Note, Snepp v. United States: The CIA
Secrecy Agreement and the First Amendment, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 662 (1981).
46. The literature on the abusive practices of the intelligence agencies is voluminous.
See sufpra note 3.
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govern the conduct of the intelligence agencies be examined and
clarified.47
There are two main constitutional problems. One is the scope of the
power of the intelligence agencies to engage in surveillance which is not
directly related to law enforcement. The other concerns the methods
employed by the intelligence agencies in carrying on their activities.
1. Scope of Power
Limitations on the scope of the government's power to engage in
political surveillance might come from two sources. It can be argued
that the basic affirmative power of the government to collect informa-
tion or carry on other intelligence activities does not extend to certain
types of conduct. This lack of affirmative power might be particularly
applicable to the federal government, which possesses only the powers
enumerated in the federal Constitution. Similarly, it might be that,
under the doctrine of separation of powers, the executive branch is not
authorized to engage in data collection without express authorization
of the legislature. On the other hand, the need of the government for
information is beyond question and it would be difficult to say in many
situations that the gathering of data is unrelated to any legitimate func-
tion or not implied in some existing legislation. The same might be
true, though to a lesser extent, of surveillance activities that go beyond
the mere collection of information. On balance it can be said that con-
siderations relating to the absence of affirmative power should not be
ignored; they have relevance to the constitutional issues and at times
may be decisive. Nevertheless it would seem that effective restriction
on the scope of the government's intelligence power must come from
the more precise constitutional limitations designed to protect the indi-
vidual against government abuse of power. The principal constitu-
tional guarantee involved here is the right to freedom of expression
embodied in the First Amendment. We deal first with the mere gather-
ing and storing of information and, second, with intelligence activities
that constitute more positive attempts to influence political conduct.48
47. On Attorney General Levi's guidelines, see J. ELLIFF, THE REFORM OF FBI INTELLI-
GENCE OPERATIONS (1979). The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, regulating the use of
electronic devices in foreign intelligence investigations, is Pub. L. No. 95-511 (1978) (codi-
fied at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1 1). Coordination and control of the various intelligence agencies
operating in the foreign intelligence field is maintained through Executive Orders, the most
recent of which is Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (issued Dec. 4, 1981).
48. On the basic power of the executive branch of the federal government to conduct
political surveillance, note should be taken of the Privacy Act of 1974, which provides that
no governmental agency may maintain records "describing how any individual exercises
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or. ..
unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." 5
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The problem of concern is not the government's power to investigate
a crime that has been or is about to be committed, or to obtain material
necessary for enforcement of a legitimate government regulation. In
such cases any impact upon the right of an individual to freedom of
expression has never been considered to be of constitutional dimen-
sions. Nor are we concerned here with government collection of eco-
nomic or similar data that has no impact upon freedom of expression.
Rather, the issue arises where the collection of data is not related, or
only remotely related, to law enforcement and is principally designed
to inform the government about the political beliefs, attitudes, or activi-
ties of individuals or organizations in the community. It must be con-
ceded that the distinction involved is often difficult to draw. It is,
.however, fundamental to the constitutional issue.
The question then becomes, what is the effect of the government's
conduct upon free exercise of the right to speak, associate with others in
political organizations, and engage in similar activities protected by the
First Amendment. At least where the government's gathering of data is
directed at unpopular, unorthodox, or dissenting expression, there can
be no doubt that, as a factual matter, the impact is severe. Knowledge
that the government is collecting and storing information about one's
political views and associations is inherently inhibiting. Thus many
persons will hesitate to attend a meeting where the police are taking
down license numbers, or engage in a demonstration where photo-
graphs of the marchers are being made. Rumors that files are being
kept by the government evoke memories of the harassments and witch-
hunts that have intermittently taken place over the years. Suspicion
that government infiltrators are reporting the discussion at meetings, or
pressing a hidden agenda, dampen the spontaneity or destroy the har-
mony of a political gathering. The atmosphere almost inevitably cre-
ated by a program of political surveillance was well described in a
memorandum by the head of a local FBI office urging his agents to
engage in more physical interviews. It is important, said this official, in
order to "enhance the paranoia endemic in these circles and [to] further
serve to get the point across that there is an FBI agent behind every
mailbox."
4 9
U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7) (1976). Cases where the Supreme Court has held governmental activity
which impinges on constitutional rights unauthorized in the absence of express delegation
from the legislature include the Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579, and Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S.
713, cases. See also Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116
(1958).
49. FBI Memorandum, quoted in N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1971, at 33, col. 1, and in Note,
supra note 1, at 1277 n.189. Further, on the impact of political surveillance upon the free-
dom of expression, see Justice Powell's opinion in the Keith case, 407 U.S. at 314; Judge
Wright's opinion in Zweiborn v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 633-36 (1975). See Comment, Pre.
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There would seem to be no doubt, then, that political surveillance,
even when confined to the collection and storage of data, does have a
significant adverse effect upon freedom of expression and thereby
brings into play the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has found
a similar "chilling effect" in many comparable situations. Thus in La-
mont v. Postmaster General,50 the Court held unconstitutional a federal
statute which required persons to notify the post office if they wanted to
receive mail addressed to them from abroad which the Secretary of the
Treasury had labelled "communist political propaganda." This re-
quirement, said the Court, "is almost certain to have a deterrent ef-
fect." 5' In Talley v. California52 the Court struck down a city ordinance
which prohibited the distribution of handbills that did not contain the
name and address of the authors and disseminators. In NAACP v. Ala-
bama53 and Bates v. City of Little Rock 54 regulations that required dis-
closure of membership in, or financial support of, the NAACP were
ruled invalid. Likewise in Watkins v. United States55 and many subse-
quent cases the Court has held that the calling of witnesses before a
legislative committee to testify about their political beliefs and associa-
tions has a constitutional impact upon First Amendment rights. In all
these cases the injury to the system of freedom of expression grew out
of efforts by the government simply to collect information concerning
political activities not directly related to the enforcement of a valid
law.5 6
It is true that in the one case where the Supreme Court addressed a
specific claim that collection of data on lawful political activities by an
intelligence agency violated First Amendment rights it did not grant a
remedy. In Laird v. Tatum57 the plaintiffs brought a class action for
declaratory and injunctive relief against the Department of the Army,
alleging that Army Intelligence was conducting an extensive program
of surveillance of "lawful and peaceful civilian political activity." The
government justified its operations on the ground that the "data-gath-
ering system" was established in connection with the development of
ventive Intelligence Systems and the Courts, 58 CALIF. L. REv. 914 (1970); Note, Governmen-
tal Investigations ofthe Exercise offirst Amendment Rights: Citizens' Rights and Remedies,
60 MINN. L. REv. 1257 (1976); Stickgold, Yesterday's Paranoia Is Today's Reality: Documen-
tation ofPolice Surveillance ofFirst Amendment Activity, 55 U. OF DETROIT J. OF URBAN L.
877, 892-929 (1978).
50. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
51. Id. at 307.
52. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
53. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
54. 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
55. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
56. See also Gibson v. Florida Leg. Investigative Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
57. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
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contingency plans, if called upon by the President, to assist local au-
thorities in putting down public disorders. By a six to three vote the
Court upheld a motion to dismiss for the reason that plaintiffs "have
not presented a case for resolution by the courts. '58 The plaintiffs had
alleged only a "subjective" chill, the majority stated, not a claim of
"specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm." 59
The Supreme Court's decision technically went only to the question
of standing to raise the constitutional issue, not to the merits of the
constitutional claim. Thus a further factual showing on the part of the
persons affected would presumably produce a different result. How-
ever that may be, the opinion of the majority in Laird v. Tatum cannot
be squared with the principles that should control efforts by the judici-
ary to reconcile protection of national security with the maintenance of
constitutional liberties:
1. The Court gave little weight to the values promoted by the sys-
tem of freedom of expression. Its preference for supporting the mili-
tary was abrupt and arbitrary.
2. The Court, far from reacting with skepticism to the government's
claim that massive surveillance of legitimate political activities was
necessary in order to prepare for the Army's possible role in civil dis-
turbances, accepted the government's explanation with complaisance,
not to say eagerness. It wholly neglected to consider the remoteness of
the information collected to the Army's function in protecting national
security.
3. The Court utterly failed to appreciate, or was not interested in,
the dynamics of the system of freedom of expression. In finding no
constitutional impact arising from the surveillance program the Court
ignored the breadth and depth of the Army's operations. As the minor-
ity pointed out, the allegations were that (a) "the Army maintains files
on the membership, ideology, programs, and practices of virtually
every activist political group in the country, including groups such as
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Clergy and Laymen
United Against the War in Vietnam, The American Civil Liberties
Union, Women's Strike for Peace, and the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People"; (b) that the Army "uses undercover
agents to infiltrate these civilian groups and to reach into confidential
files of students and other groups"; (c) that the Army "moves as a secret
group among civilian audiences, using cameras and electronic ears for
surveillance"; (d) that the data collected "are distributed to civilian offi-
cials in state, federal, and local governments"; and (e) that "these data
58. Id. at 15.
59. Id. at 13-14.
104
Vol. 9:78, 1982
National Security and Civil Liberties
are stored in one or more data banks. '60
4. The Court made no effort to limit the Army's surveillance activi-
ties to the narrowest possible area of constraint.61
If it be accepted, despite Laird v. Tatum, that a government program
to collect and store information on legitimate political activities does
have a severe inhibiting effect upon freedom of expression the question
becomes whether such infringement constitutes a violation of the First
Amendment. If rights under the First Amendment are given full pro-
tection, the answer is not open to doubt: in any situation where a sub-
stantial adverse impact is shown, First Amendment rights prevail; the
government must seek its objective in some other way. This has been
the approach of the Supreme Court in some cases, such as Lamont and
Talley, mentioned above. In other cases, however, the Court has ap-
plied a balancing test, and here the result cannot be so clearly antici-
pated. Nevertheless, in any weighing process, the First Amendment
rights should normally be found paramount.
The impact upon freedom of expression from political surveillance is
drastic; if conducted on any substantial scale it creates the atmosphere
of a police state. As to countervailing interests, insofar as the goals
sought by the government are to influence and constrain dissenting
opinion, they are illegitimate and entitled to no weight. To the extent
that the government's objectives are to obtain information concerning
the enforcement of existing laws, the surveillance of lawful political
activities is of remote and dubious value. Where the government is
seeking information for use in developing new law, it can and must do
so without infringing on First Amendment rights. In short, justification
for inhibiting freedom of expression in order to obtain data pertaining
to legitimate political activities can rarely be demonstrated. This
would be particularly true if the Court adhered to the subsidiary princi-
ples applicable in national security balancing cases, namely, by starting
with a presumption in favor of the First Amendment, placing the bur-
den of proof on the government to show compelling reasons, viewing
the government's claims with skepticism, and insisting on use of the
least drastic means.
If one moves from the mere collection and storage of data to other
features of political surveillance the constitutional issues are hardly
open to debate. Any program of political surveillance tends to expand
60. Id. at 24-25.
61. Laird v. Tatum has not always been rigorously followed by the lower courts. See,
e.g., Paton v. LaPrade, 382 F. Supp. 1118 (D.N.J. 1974), a 'd, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975).
For a collection of the lower court decisions see N. DORSEN, P. BENDER, B. NEUBORNE & T.
EMERSON, supra note 21, at 196-98. See also Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General,
419 U.S. 1314 (1974).
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beyond the simple gathering of information. Thus an infiltrator placed
in an organization under surveillance must begin to play a significant
part in the affairs of that organization in order to obtain information
and maintain credibility. Officials and agents of the intelligence agency
start with, or soon acquire, intense hostility to the ideas and activities of
the groups under investigation. Inevitably the intelligence agencies de-
velop a sense of mission which leads to affirmative programs to harass,
disrupt, and ultimately destroy the targets of their surveillance. The
tactics employed have included forging documents, spreading false ru-
mors, promoting mistrust, making it difficult to obtain a meeting place,
disrupting meetings, provoking violence between organizations, and
similar conduct. The most notorious example of these practices was the
FBI Cointelpro program. But the same methods were used by the CIA,
other federal intelligence agencies, and many state and local "red
squads." Plainly, operations of this sort-aggressive governmental
conduct designed to interfere with legitimate political activities-can-
not be justified under any theory of the First Amendment or any con-
cept of national security. Although a number of cases which raise these
issues are pending in the lower federal courts, the Supreme Court has
not yet had occasion to deal with them.62
2. Methods of Surveillance
A series of constitutional provisions imposes limits on the methods
used by intelligence agencies in conducting political surveillance. Thus
wiretapping, bugging, opening mail, break-ins, and other forms of
search and seizure are subject to the restrictions of the Fourth Amend-
ment. The imposition of semi-official sanctions through Cointelpro
tactics is foreclosed by the due process clause. In some circumstances
the use of intrusive techniques would also violate the First Amendment
or the constitutional right of privacy. A major gap in the protective
coverage of these constitutional guarantees occurs in the use of inform-
ers and infiltrators; the Supreme Court has held that the obtaining of
information through these methods is not limited by the Fourth
Amendment. In general, however, the intelligence agencies, like all
government agencies, must adhere to a strict set of standards in carry-
ing on their operations. The question is whether those standards are to
be relaxed or abandoned when the subject of an investigation involves
matters pertaining to national security.63
62. For a discussion of the remedies available, see Note, supra note 49, at 1270-87.
63. On the exclusion of the use of informers and infiltrators from the coverage of the
Fourth Amendment, see United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Hoffa v. United States,
385 U.S. 293 (1965); Comment, Domestic Intelligence Informants, the First Amendment and
the Needfor Prior Judicial Review, 26 BUFFALO L. REV. 173 (1976).
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The key decision of the Supreme Court is the Keith case. As previ-
ously noted, the Court there squarely rejected the government's conten-
tion that surveillance directed at the protection of national security
need not be conducted within the limits of the Fourth Amendment.
The basic rationale of the Court was that the functions served by the
Fourth Amendment were fully as necessary in national security cases
as in other areas of investigation:
Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly be guaranteed if domestic
security surveillances may be conducted solely within the discretion of the
Executive branch .... The historical judgment, which the Fourth
Amendment accepts, is that unreviewed executive discretion may yield
too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook
potential invasions of privacy and protected speech.64
The Court went on to discuss and dismiss the specific reasons put for-
ward by the government for making an exception in national security
cases:
1. To the argument that "special circumstances applicable to do-
mestic security surveillances" justified an exception it answered: "Se-
curity surveillances are especially sensitive because of the inherent
vagueness of the domestic security concept, the necessarily broad and
continuing nature of intelligence gathering, and the temptation to util-
ize such surveillances to oversee political dissent. '65
2. To the proposition that national security cases involved "a large
number of complex and subtle factors" beyond the competence of the
judiciary, the Court replied: "Courts regularly deal with the most diffi-
cult issues of our society. There is no reason to believe that federal
judges will be insensitive to or uncomprehending of the issues involved
in domestic security cases."'66
3. To the contention that "prior judicial approval will fracture the
secrecy essential to official intelligence gathering," the Court declared:
"The investigation of criminal activity has long involved imparting
sensitive information to judicial officers who have respected the confi-
dentialities involved. Judges may be counted upon to be especially
conscious of security requirements in national security cases." 67
The reasoning of the Supreme Court in the Keith case applies to all
intrusive methods employed by the intelligence agencies in the conduct
of their operations. The essence of the decision is that the intelligence
agencies must adhere to the traditional principle that surveillance for
64. 407 U.S. at 316-17.
65. Id. at 320.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 320-21. See also Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 636-55 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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national security purposes must take place within the structure of our
constitutional system.
The Court in the Keith case, however, made one important reserva-
tion. It pointed out that the case dealt only with "the domestic aspects
of national security" and that it was expressing no opinion as to "the
issues which may be involved with respect to activities of foreign pow-
ers or their agents."' 68 On the basis of this distinction the government,
while apparently accepting the guarantees of the Constitution in "do-
mestic security" surveillance, has argued that they do not apply to "for-
eign intelligence" activities. The Court has thus far not clarified its
position.69
The term "foreign intelligence" is open to a variety of interpreta-
tions. Regardless of the exact definition, however, the distinction be-
tween domestic and foreign intelligence activities is unwarranted and
dangerous. So long as intelligence operations are carried on in the
United States or are directed at American citizens abroad, they should
be conducted within the confines of our constitutional guarantees. Sur-
veillance taking place within the United States almost invariably in-
volves American citizens and residents; surveillance of Americans
abroad necessarily does so. The protection afforded to American citi-
zens and residents by the Constitution are just as important and just as
necessary whether the subject matter of the investigation relates to do-
mestic or foreign matters. Nor, for the reasons stated in the Keith case,
are the arguments for allowing unreviewed discretion in the executive
branch any stronger in foreign than in domestic security cases. Fur-
thermore, it is not possible to make any clear distinction between the
two areas. For example, many domestic organizations have some for-
eign ties, and many American citizens possess information of interest to
foreign countries. An exception for "foreign intelligence" would thus
open the way to political surveillance on a virtually unlimited scale and
would have a devastating effect upon our system of individual liberties.
The only safe course is to insist upon adherence to constitutional re-
68. 407 U.S. at 321-22.
69. A number of lower federal courts have dealt with the issue. In Zweibon v. Mitchell,
516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that
Fourth Amendment rights must be recognized where the target of the surveillance (there, the
Jewish Defense League) was neither an agent of a foreign power nor acting in collaboration
therewith, even though the information sought pertained to foreign affairs. In United States
v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980), the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held
that Fourth Amendment protections did not extend to an alleged foreign agent charged with
espionage. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in both cases. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 425
U.S. 944 (1976); United States v. Truong, 454 U.S. 1144 (1982).
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quirements across the board.70
C. TravelAbroad
Considerations of national security have also had an impact on the
constitutional rights of American citizens travelling abroad. Until re-
cently the basic principles appeared to be well established. As a result
of Reid v. Covert,71 holding that an American civilian residing on a
military base abroad was entitled to a civilian trial with its accompany-
ing constitutional guarantees, it seemed clear that American citizens
overseas, in their dealings with American officials, were entitled to all
the constitutional rights of citizens at home.72 As to the right of Ameri-
can citizens to obtain a passport, Kent v. Dulles73 held that the State
Department lacked power to deny a passport because of an applicant's
political beliefs or associations. The Kent case rested on a lack of ex-
press authority from Congress, but the constitutional implications were
clear. In any event, numerous other cases have held that a government
benefit or privilege cannot be conditioned upon refraining from the ex-
ercise of constitutional rights.74 In 1981, however, the Supreme Court's
decision in Haig v. Agee75 cast doubt upon this whole structure.
In the Agee case the Secretary of State revoked the passport of Philip
Agee, a former CIA employee, under a departmental regulation au-
thorizing that action where the activities of an American citizen abroad
"are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national secur-
ity or the foreign policy of the United States." The Secretary of State
alleged that Agee was engaged in a campaign "to disrupt the intelli-
gence operations of the United States" by exposing the names of under-
cover CIA officers or agents.76 In a motion for summary judgment
Agee admitted the factual allegations. The Supreme Court, by a vote
of seven to two, upheld the revocation of Agee's passport. Most of the
majority opinion was devoted to establishing that, despite the ruling in
Kent v. Dulles, the Secretary of State had authorization from Congress
70. For further discussion, see Note, Foreign Security Surveillance and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 87 HARv. L. REv. 976 (1974).
71. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
72. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 231 (1978).
73. 357 U.S. 116 (1958). Cf. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (upholding area
restrictions).
74. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 598 (1972); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)
(rule against conditioning a governmental benefit or privilege upon abandonment of consti-
tutional rights).
75. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
76. Id. at 286.
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to withhold or revoke passports for reasons of national security or for-
eign policy. Discussion of the constitutional issues was brief.
The constitutional right to travel abroad, the majority held, was
"subordinate to national security and foreign policy considerations,"
and as such was "subject to reasonable governmental regulation;" and,
since "no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of
the Nation," the regulation involved was justified.77 As to the First
Amendment claim, the majority began by "[a]ssuming, arguendo, that
First Amendment protections reach beyond our national boundaries."
It went on to hold that, although "revocation of Agee's passport rests in
part on the content of his speech," obstructing intelligence operations
and the recruiting of intelligence personnel "are clearly not protected
by the Constitution." 78 The majority added that, "[tlo the extent the
revocation of his passport operates to inhibit Agee 'it is an inhibition of
action' rather than of speech." 79 The underlying approach of the ma-
jority was made explicit in an opening comment: "Matters intimately
related to foreign policy and national security are rarely proper subjects
for judicial intervention." 80
The opinion of the majority in Haig v. Agee constitutes a repudiation
of virtually every precept that should guide the Supreme Court in
resolving a conflict between national security and constitutional
liberties:
1. The Supreme Court virtually abandoned any role in the process
of maintaifiing constitutional liberties where national security is in-
volved. Far from giving priority to constitutional rights, and viewing
government claims with skepticism, it came close to bowing out
altogether.
2. Without discussion, the Court concluded that the right to travel
abroad was automatically "subordinate" to national security and for-
eign policy considerations. Thus the constitutional right can be abro-
gated by any "reasonable" regulation in the name of national security.
3. By "assuming arguendo" that First Amendment rights extended
to citizens abroad, but not accepting that proposition, the Court cast
doubt upon the previously established principle that American citizens
overseas could claim the protection of the Constitution against acts of
American officials.
4. The Court gave no weight to First Amendment considerations.
77. Id. at 307.
78. Id. at 308.
79. Id. at 309 (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965)).
80. Id. at 292.
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It simply held, again without discussion, that speech or other expres-
sion which "obstructed" intelligence operations was "clearly not pro-
tected by the Constitution." It did not even adopt a balancing process.
5. In holding that "inhibition of action" by conditioning a govern-
ment benefit or privilege upon refraining from speech was permissible,
the Court repudiated the long established doctrine that such benefits or
privileges could not be withheld because of the exercise of constitu-
tional rights.
6. The Court made no effort to confine the restriction upon the
right to travel abroad to the narrowest possible constraint.
If the courts react to national security claims in the manner of the
Agee case, their usefulness in supporting constitutional liberties virtu-
ally disappears.
Conclusion
In the long run national security is not achieved at the expense of
constitutional liberties. A tightly closed security system, seeking to
avoid all risks, is not compatible with a democratic society. Nor is it,
ultimately, attainable. The effort to resolve the tensions between na-
tional security and constitutional rights should not be looked upon as a
zero-sum game. It is not true that the greater the degree of constitu-
tional liberty maintained, the lesser the degree of national security
achieved, or that the lesser degree of constitutional liberty the greater
the degree of national security. Rather, there must be an accommoda-
tion between the two systems in which each supplements and supports
the other.
In this process the role of the courts is crucial. They start from the
traditional position that measures to assure national security must con-
form to our system of constitutional rights. Yet national security fac-
tors inevitably affect the way constitutional limitations are applied and
hence the issues come before them in a fluid state. Because of the pres-
sures exerted by appeals to national security, the tendency of the gov-
ernment to overstate the dangers, and the likelihood of invoking
national security for improper purposes, the courts must be constantly
alert not to be stampeded. To perform an effective role they must ap-
proach claims of the executive and legislative branches with skepticism
and firmness, and must insist upon principles which force the govern-
ment to meet exacting standards. The Supreme Court has done this at
times, as in the Steel Seizure, the Pentagon Papers, and the Keith cases.
But at other times it has wavered and retreated. The extent to which
our constitutional structure will be preserved, in the face of mounting
The Yale Journal of World Public Order Vol. 9:78, 1982
tensions, depends in large measure upon the leadership exerted by the
judicial system.
